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Executive Summary  
Media policy in Turkey has shaped the media-state relationship since the establishment of the 
first newspaper in the late Ottoman period. While regulations were often employed as an 
effective disciplinary tool against the press in processes of state formation and modernization, 
opponent journalists have constantly been suppressed by state and non-state actors who 
claimed to act in the name of ‘state interests’.  
The coup d’état in 1980 and the concomitant economic liberalisation changed the ownership 
structure of the media sector with the entry of new investors. Following the abolishment of 
state monopoly on broadcasting in the 1990s, big conglomerates expanding through vertical 
and horizontal mergers have dominated all fields of the media. The high concentrated market 
structure in the media was made possible due to the inadequacy of legal barriers to cross-
mergers, as well as the lack of measures that would prevent media conglomerates from 
participating in public tenders in other sectors of the economy. The shortcomings of the 
regulatory framework to promote press freedom and diversity in the media has encouraged 
big corporations to regard themselves as legitimate political actors that can bargain with the 
government. 
Media ownership was restructured following the economic crisis in 2001. Big media groups, 
which had investments in the financial and banking sectors, were particularly affected by the 
crisis; some being completely wiped out of the market, while others were seized by the state. 
Shortly after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AK Parti) came 
to power in 2002, the mainstream media was reconfigured ideologically as either ‘opponent’ 
or ‘proponent’ to the government. 
Notwithstanding the limited positive effects of the EU accession process on media freedom, 
there are dozens of ECtHR judgments regarding freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press waiting to be executed by the Turkish state. Journalists who are powerless vis-à-vis the 
owners and political power are particularly affected by the political polarisation in the media. 
The structural obstacles to unionization and the lack of solidarity in the profession lead to 
labour exploitation, low quality content and violations of media ethics. 
The lack of a strong pro-democracy social movement; the ideological conservatism of the 
judiciary; the institutional weakness of the parliament; and the lack of democracy within 
political parties render the government – and future governments – too powerful vis-à-vis the 
society and the media. On a positive note, however, there is a growing awareness on the need 
for social monitoring of the media. In the absence of a widely accepted and established self-
regulatory framework, various non-governmental organizations and activist groups started to 
watch the media in order to expand the culture of diversity and to reduce discrimination, 
racism and hate speech.  
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1. Introduction  
The media in Turkey has been in the limelight in recent years. Though historically the media 
has never been immune to the influence of political power and internal ideological 
polarization, the sharp divisions and extreme politicization of the Turkish media over the last 
decade is unprecedented. The media once again proved to be a critical actor at a time when 
the country was undergoing a historic process of political and social transition, and was 
acutely divided based on the political power struggle between the military and the 
government. The side various media organs chose to align with in this conflict was not 
simply a matter of political preference; it was a reflection of the deep social, economic and 
political transition taking place in the country since the 1980s. The consecutive and at times 
simultaneous processes of economic liberalisation, globalization and democratization 
produced various outcomes for the media sector, which has undergone a significant 
structural, technological and ideological change itself. On the other hand, the current state of 
affairs in the media and its interdependent relationship with the state cannot solely be 
explained by the developments of the past three decades. The political economy and 
ownership structure of the media, the vulnerability of journalists vis-à-vis their bosses and the 
absence of a motive for an independent media in pursuit of the truth can only be explained 
and understood with a due account of the historical origins of the media in Turkey.  
 Research on media independence and freedom of press in any country, and 
particularly Turkey, requires more than an analysis of the regulatory framework. It is the 
political and ideological factors that lie behind the anti-democratic and repressive laws, rather 
than the content and implementation of these laws that can explain why and under which 
circumstances an independent and free media fails to emerge in a given country. This report 
is an attempt to understand the absence of media freedom and independence in Turkey 
through a historical lens for a critical analysis of the current state of the state-media relations.  
 The report aims to analyze and explain the actors and processes of media policy 
making in Turkey; the substance and implementation of such policies; the legal framework 
governing media content; the ownership structure of the media; the working conditions of 
journalists; and the emerging social efforts to combat discrimination and hate speech in the 
media. Part two of this report focuses on the actors and values that affect the media policies, 
highlighting the significant role of big corporations in shaping structural regulation and 
competition. In part three, the structure of the media market and the conduct of big players 
are examined from the perspective of democracy and diversity. Since the major problems 
facing the media in Turkey stem from the legal system, Part four discusses the ‘mentality’ 
that shapes content regulation as a significant obstacle to journalistic freedoms. The 
vulnerable position of journalists vis-à-vis media owners and the political power is also the 
result of a lack of horizontal solidarity in the profession. In Part five, the working conditions 
of journalists, journalistic standards and practices are reviewed. Finally, Part six looks at 
media literacy in Turkey. Considering the high access rate of television (98 per cent) and long 
watching hours, the media literacy education initiated in primary education deserves close 
scrutiny. Both the content and the teaching methodology of this class raise serious issues. 
Taking into account that media literacy is not only a matter of education, but also a political 
and ideological issue, this part discusses the opportunities created by campaigns of advocacy 
groups. 
The report is based on a review of the relevant literature, legal research and 
discussions with the main media actors in Turkey. Six closed workshops1 were organised as 
                                                            
1 Workshops organized: ‘Media and democratisation’ (Istanbul, 8/10/2010); ‘Human resources problems and the 
future of the media sector’ (Ankara, 18/12/2010); ‘Labour relations and working conditions in the media sector’ 
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part of the fieldwork, bringing together a total of 41 individuals from public and private 
media who are directly or indirectly concerned with media freedom and independence in 
Turkey. Additionally, we conducted one-on-one interviews with media professionals, 
journalists, representatives of regulatory agencies and policy makers.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
(Ankara, 21/12/2010); ‘The new legislation on the structure and authority of the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council’ (Istanbul, 11/3/2011); ‘Investment and competition media sector relations: the present and the future of 
the sector’ (Istanbul, 21/4/2011); and ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and governance 
regulations’ (Ankara, 18/10/ 2011). 
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2. Actors and values of media policy 
Turkey did not have a regulatory framework governing media content until the mid 1990s, 
owing to the domination of the state in all sectors of the economy, including the media. Until 
the mid 1980s, the state had direct control over the media. In 1983, the coming to power of 
the neoliberal Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) following the end of the military 
rule marked a turning point in Turkey’s economy. ANAP’s leader Turgut Özal initiated a 
process of economic liberalization and adopted free-market reforms. The new government’s 
support for private entrepreneurship encouraged big corporations to enter the media sector. 
Despite a constitutional ban on private broadcasting, Turkey’s first private television station, 
Magic Box, was launched in 1990 via satellite from Europe. This resulted in the entry into the 
market of various other private broadcasters; radio and television stations were launched one 
after another in blatant disregard of the constitution (Elmas and Kurban, 2010).   
The legal chaos ensuing from the rapid deregulation of the media and the ‘emergence 
of cartels due to the low number of actors which entered the sector’ gave rise to the need for a 
regulatory framework to govern the market.2 This resulted in the adoption of the first 
broadcasting law, no. 3984,3 and the establishment of the Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu-RTÜK) for ‘regulating and inspecting the activities 
of radio and televisions.’4 The policymakers’ main concern in adopting the law was to control 
the content of private audio-visual companies and to make sure that they complied with rules 
and regulations. In the past decade, the principal trigger behind policy making in the media 
has been the need to harmonize the laws with the EU’s acquis. The most recent example of 
this phenomenon was the adoption of a new broadcasting law in accordance with the EU’s 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (hereon referred to as the Directive or the EU 
Directive) in 2011. The consideration of the commercial needs of private broadcasters amidst 
rapid technological improvements was also influential in the adoption of the law. At first 
glance, the new law is in compliance with the Directive. A careful read, however, shows that 
the law exceeds the scope of the Directive by introducing additional content and ownership 
restrictions.   
The politically nationalist and culturally conservative values endorsed in the 
constitutional and legal framework have diffused into the media policy making process. 
Relevant ministries, agencies and institutions responsible for media regulation strictly adhere 
to these principles, while at the same time paying lip service to freedom of expression, 
freedom of the press and the right to privacy. Where the inherent tension between these goals 
comes to surface, policy makers make a clear choice on the side of the protection of the 
family, nation and the state over the individual.  
As in all other areas, policy making in the media in Turkey is a centralized and 
bureaucratic process where values and priorities are set by the executive. Until recently, the 
principal executive organ in charge of the media was the Ministry of the State. An executive 
decree adopted on 17 August 2011, however, now authorizes the Ministry of the EU Affairs 
to monitor and inspect the activities and transactions of autonomous regulatory agencies – 
including those in charge of media regulation.5 While the implications of this change remain 
                                                            
2 Erol Katırcıoğlu, professor of economics at Istanbul Bilgi University, minutes of the workshop on the topic of  
‘Media and regulatory high bodies: the status of legal and governance regulations’, Ankara, 18/10/2011. 
3 Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkında Kanun [Law on the Establishment of Radio and 
Television Enterprises and their Broadcasts], no. 3984, Official Gazette no. 21911, 20 April 1994. The law was 
repealed with the adoption of the new Broadcasting Law, no. 6112, on 15 February 2011. 
4 Constitution Art. 133.  
5 Avrupa Birliği Bakanlığının Teşkilat ve Görevleri hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname ile Bazı Kanun ve 
Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Hükmünde Kararname [Decree with 
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to be seen, the shift in authority ‘is perceived as an intervention to the autonomy of these 
agencies’6 and a ‘strategic policy change on the part of the government.’7  
 Again, generally speaking, the parliament has a very limited role in policy making in 
the media. In accordance with strict party discipline which dominates the political culture in 
Turkey, parliamentarians very often vote in line with party politics. Little discussion on 
substantive issues takes place in the parliament and, to the extent that it does, it remains 
extremely partisan. Opposition parties often express their opinions through accusations rather 
than constructive criticism whereas the government rarely takes into account their feedback. 
The reactive political culture of lawmaking and the legislative workload caused by the need 
to harmonize the national legal framework with the EU’s acquis communautaire prevent the 
parliament from timely responding to the unforeseen needs arising from the rapidly changing 
media sector.8 The parliament’s minimal role in lawmaking has been further restricted by the 
recent government strategy to make legislative amendments through executive decrees 
adopted by the cabinet, as opposed to laws enacted by the parliament. The most recent 
example of this strategy in the media is the adoption of the executive decree no. 649 
mentioned above. During the lawmaking process, the government rarely consults civil 
society, and where it does, the input collected is often not reflected in the policy output.9 The 
regulatory agencies’ role in policy making is also quite limited; they are tasked with 
preparing drafts in accordance with the political priorities of the government, which then 
finalizes these before submission to the parliament.10 
The independence and impartiality of bureaucratic regulatory agencies have been 
contested all along in Turkey: ‘The political branch replaces and reaffirms itself through 
these authorities.’11  Undoubtedly, the agency whose impartiality and autonomy have been 
most fiercely contested is RTÜK. Tasked with allocating licences and permits for terrestrial, 
satellite and cable broadcasting; supervising broadcasting content; responding to audience 
complaints; and imposing sanctions in cases of non-compliance, RTÜK’s mandate extends to 
both radios and televisions. The decisions of the agency are open to judicial review.  
Though defined in the constitution and its founding law as an autonomous public legal 
entity, RTÜK lacks the mandate to develop its own principles and the power to regulate.12 
Instead, it is expected to operate within the substantive boundaries drawn by the parliament 
and its powers are limited to sanctioning the media (as discussed in section 4.1.). The 
agency’s efforts to introduce new norms can be prevented by courts, even if it is in the name 
of protecting rights and freedoms and furthering public interest. A recent example was 
RTÜK’s failed attempt to sanction broadcasts displaying violence against animals. Though 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Force of Law Concerning Amendments to the Decree with Force of Law Concerning the Organization and 
Powers of the Ministry of European Union Affairs and to Certain Laws and Decrees Having the Force of Law] 
no. 649, Official Gazette, no. 28028, 17 August 2011, Article 45. 
6 An official at a media regulatory agency, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Media and regulatory high 
bodies: The status of legal and governance regulations’, Ankara, 18/10/2011. 
7 Katırcıoğlu, ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and governance regulations’ Workshop. 
8 An official at a media regulatory agency, ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’ Workshop.   
9 Özden Cankaya, professor of communications, Galatasaray University, minutes of the workshop on the topic 
of ‘the new legislation on the structure and authority of the Radio and Television Supreme Council’, Istanbul, 
11/03/2011.  
10 An official at a media regulatory agency, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the 
structure and authority of the Radio and Television Supreme Council’, Istanbul, 11/03/2011. 
11 Katırcıoğlu, ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and governance regulations’ Workshop. 
12 An official at a media regulatory agency, ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’ Worskhop.  
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both the law and the agency’s executive regulation prohibit broadcasts encouraging harmful 
actions against animals,13 the sanctions it attempted to impose against a broadcaster were 
stayed by a court on the ground that the law did not grant the agency such powers.14 
RTÜK’s independence has also been a matter of contention for a long time due to its 
political composition. The agency has nine members elected by the parliament for a period of 
six years from a pool of candidates nominated by political parties. The number of nominees 
proposed by each party is dependent on the number of members it has at the parliament.  
Other relevant authoritative bodies include the Information and Communication 
Technologies Authority (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu-BTK), which is tasked with 
the supervision and sanctioning of the Internet. It enjoys administrative and financial 
autonomy. The parliament does not have a role in the process of the selection of its (seven) 
members, who are appointed by the cabinet. The parliament also lacks powers to oversee the 
agency, which reports solely to the government. The Telecommunications Communication 
Presidency (Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı-TİB) is a part of BTK. It was founded 
pursuant to a 2005 amendment in the Police Law15 for the specific purpose of law 
enforcement in the telecommunications sector. Among the members of the agency are the 
representatives of the National Intelligence Agency, the Directorate General of the Police and 
the Gendarmerie Central Command. Tasked with the centralized administration of 
telecommunication wiretapping in Turkey, TİB is required to share the information it gathers 
with the intelligence, the police and the gendarmerie and, upon request, with the courts and 
prosecutors.  
The Competition Authority (Rekabet Kurumu) is an autonomous regulatory body 
tasked with enforcing competition rules in all sectors of the economy, including the media. 
The authority’s broad mandate and the high number of complaints it receives from all sectors 
create a heavy workload. The agency has been able to examine only 10 per cent of the 
applications it has received so far, confirming the need for developing specific competition 
rules for the media and more effective mechanisms for supervision.16 
 The Directorate General of Press Advertisement (Basın İlan Kurumu-BİK) is tasked 
with allocating official advertisements and announcements to the print media. The 
legitimacy, function, and lack of autonomy of the agency have been contested issues ever 
since it was founded. The fact that BİK has the powers to prohibit advertisements to any 
publication it deems to have violated media ethics as a sanction can create a censorship effect 
due to the state-dependent structure of the agency. Nevertheless, in recent years, BİK has 
allocated a significant portion of its activities to strengthening the local press. It has come to 
an agreement with RTÜK on using the 3 per cent contribution the latter collects from 
television channels to strengthen the local media. This has been evaluated as a positive 
development in terms of the promotion of the local media, the better representation of 
geographical diversity of society and the improvement of the quality of local journalism.  
 
 
                                                            
13 Yayın Hizmeti Usul ve Esasları Hakkında Yönetmelik [Regulation on the Principles and Substance of 
Broadcasting Services], Official Gazette no. 28103, 2 November 2011, Art. 8(l). 
14 An official at a media regulatory agency, ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’ Workshop. 
15 Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun [Law on the Amendment of Certain Laws], no. 5397, 3 
July 2005, Official Gazette no. 25884, 23 July 2005, Art. 1. 
16 An official at the Competition Authority, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘investment and 
competition relations in the media sector: the present and the future of the sector’, Istanbul, 21/04/2011. 
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3. The structure of the Turkish media market  
Since the launch of the first newspaper in the Ottoman Empire to the industrialisation of the 
press in the 1960s, journalism in Turkey has been led by a small group of journalists or 
journalist families who have also had a leading role in the social and political processes of 
change during the foundation of the republic. The liberalisation in the 1980s catalyzed the 
entry of other actors into the sector and changed the profile of investors (owners) of the 
media. In the 1990s, with the termination of state monopoly over broadcasting, the Turkish 
media market started to be dominated by a few conglomerates, which increased their 
economic power through vertical and horizontal mergers, and pursued competition strategies 
by setting up cartels and engaging in promotion wars. This situation changed considerably 
with the 2001 economic crisis and the ensuing state regulation of the banking sector. Those 
media groups which had investments in the financial and banking sectors were particularly 
affected by the crisis; some of them were completely wiped out while others were seized by 
the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu-TMSF) established by 
the government. 
 The high concentrated market structure in the media has been due to the inadequacy 
of legal barriers to cross-mergers, as well as the investments of the media owners in other 
sectors. Today, that ‘media is used as a weapon by the groups for their non-media 
investments’ is a widely accepted opinion in Turkey (Sönmez, 2003; Bek, 2004; Adaklı, 
2006). Almost all big media groups have investments in the energy, telecommunications, 
financial or construction sectors among others. There are no barriers for preventing these 
groups from participating to public tenders either. Consequently, while public interest is 
sacrificed for business interests, the media competes with the government for political power 
and profit, rather than performing its watchdog function.  
 
3.1 Media ownership  
Article 28 of the Constitution and Article 3 of the Press Law do not impose an ownership 
restriction for the press. The print sector is subject only to a registration procedure prescribed 
by the Press Law, whereby the outlet is required to provide basic information about its 
printing facilities to the office of the local Chief Prosecutor.  
 Broadcasting companies, on the other hand, are subject to licensing requirement 
pursuant to Article 26 of the Constitution on the grounds that they use scarce or finite 
resources, i.e. frequencies. The allocation of such frequencies, however, has never been 
completed in Turkey. In 1995, RTÜK halted the process in the name of developing frequency 
planning first. The agency announced that it would not be accepting any new licence 
applications from television enterprises after 28 April 1995 and from radio enterprises after 8 
December 1995 (Atabek, 1999). Tenders for frequency allocations were scheduled to begin in 
1997. At the time, Turkey was going through a major political turbulence owing to the 
escalating conflict between the military and the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), the 
junior partner of the coalition government. During the National Security Council meeting on 
28 February 1997, the generals forced the government to resign. Soon after, extreme ‘security 
measures’ were introduced against Islamist organizations and media.17 Among these 
measures was the requirement for media owners and executives to get a national security 
clearance18 in order to prevent ‘separatist and reactionary’ broadcasts (Önderoğlu, 2005). As 
                                                            
17 This period has since been commonly referred to as ‘the February 28th process.’ 
18 The lawsuit filed on the grounds that this certificate, issued by the Prime Ministry, hinders freedom of the 
media, was decided by the 13th Chamber of the Council of State in 2005, with a court decision stating that the 
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a result of the ensuing bureaucratic chaos, the Prime Ministry halted the frequency planning 
process.  
 In 2001, RTÜK decided to resume the tenders, starting with national television 
enterprises, yet the Council of State (Danıştay) issued a decision to stay. In the meantime, in 
2002, a new law was adopted (no. 4756), transferring the task of frequency planning to the 
Telecommunications Authority (Telekomünikasyon Kurumu) (Kılıç, 2002). However, to this 
date, the agency has not completed the planning process. In addition to the public broadcaster 
TRT, there are 23 national, 16 regional and 212 local television channels broadcasting with 
temporary licences currently in Turkey.  
 The predicament regarding the allocation of frequencies has created a barrier by 
increasing the cost of entry to the market. This, in turn, has been a major obstacle to diversity 
and pluralism in the broadcasting media. Partially to solve this problem, the new 
Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) reassigned the task of frequency planning to RTÜK. Article 26 
(4) requires a sorting tender to be held for private radio and television enterprises: ‘media 
service provider enterprises that have been established as radio and television broadcasting 
companies and have operated in the field of radio and television broadcasting for at least one 
year, that fulfil the prerequisites specified in the tender specifications and that have obtained 
a qualification certificate from the Supreme Council to bid in the tender can participate in the 
sorting tender.’ It is clear that as a matter of priority RTÜK aims to protect the interests of the 
old players in the sector. Experts point out that the discriminate treatment of broadcasting 
companies could be a ground for legal action based on the principle of equality guaranteed 
under the Constitution.19  
 Diversity and competition are also safeguarded by regulatory frameworks that 
influence the behaviour of players in the Turkish broadcasting market. These terms refer to 
diversity of ownership as well as diversity of content and outlets (Hitchens, 2006: 9). A 
report prepared for the European Commission regards the effectiveness of a regulatory 
framework in the prevention of the undue concentration of ownership and control in the 
media as the legal indicator for ‘pluralism of ownership/control’ (Leuven, et al., 2009). The 
prevention of undue concentration can be achieved in various ways. In the past, RTÜK has 
experimented two different methods: In the first regulation (law no. 3984), ownership 
restrictions had focused on the share limits, whereby (i) a company was allowed to establish 
only one radio and only one television station; and (ii) a shareholder in any given station 
could not hold more than 20 per cent of the shares and if he/she owned shares in several 
stations, the total ratio of his/her shares could not exceed 20 per cent. The law also had 
limited cross-ownership between the newspaper and broadcasting sectors.  
 At a time when the parliament was discussing amendments to the broadcasting 
regulation in 2002, the big media companies conducted effective lobbying against these 
ownership restrictions (Bek, 2003: 262). As a result, along with the 2002 amendments (law 
no. 4756) in the broadcasting law, the share ratios were introduced as the new measure for 
restrictions on ownership. Accordingly, if the average annual viewing or listening ratio of a 
television or a radio enterprise exceeded 20 percent, then the capital share of a real or legal 
person or a capital group in an enterprise should not exceed 50 per cent. The highest ratio 
recorded at the time was 16 per cent, indicating that the legal limit was too difficult to reach 
for any broadcasting company. The new amendment also removed the restrictions on cross-
                                                                                                                                                                                        
amendment includes measures to ensure national security, national interests, public interest and rectification of 
legal shortcomings, and does not infringe upon freedom of the media. 
19 An official at a media regulatory agency, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the 
structure and authority of the Radio and Television Supreme Council’, Istanbul, 11/03/2011.  
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ownership and participation in public tenders and the stock market. Eventually, there 
remained no legal restrictions on media ownership. A research commissioned by RTÜK 
showed that the 2002 amendments enabled a media company to own 244 local and regional 
and 30 (medium sized) national stations at the same time (Cankaya and Yamaner, 2006: 240).  
 However, an intervention by the Constitutional Court changed this legislative 
framework soon after the adoption of the amendments. The court cancelled the two clauses of 
Article 29 governing media ownership on the ground that they caused monopolisation in the 
Turkish broadcasting market and violated Article 167 of the Constitution which tasks the 
state with the prevention of ‘the formation, in practice or by agreement, of monopolies and 
cartels in the markets,’ as well as Articles 26 and 28 guaranteeing respectively freedom of 
expression and freedom of press. 
 The current state of affairs concerning media ownership regulations was introduced 
by the recent broadcasting law (no. 6112) in 2011. Article 19 regulates the establishment and 
share ratios of radio and television organizations. As under the previous law, the right to 
establish radio and television stations is granted to corporations only; political parties, trade 
unions, professional organizations, co-ops, associations and local administrations are not 
allowed to own radio or television stations.20 However, the provision of the former law 
stating that ‘the production, investment, export, import, marketing and finance organizations 
shall not be permitted to engage in radio and television broadcasting’ has been repealed. With 
paragraph (ç) of Article 19, private radio and television organizations are allowed to be 
opened to public and be traded at the stock exchange, another provision differing from the 
former law. Paragraph (d) introduces a limitation on media ownership based on terrestrial 
broadcasting licences. Unlike the previous law, the share of commercial communication, 
advertising revenues and other sponsorships are regarded as criteria for protecting 
competition and preventing monopolisation in the media market. This arrangement seeks to 
prevent a media organization from getting more than 30 per cent of all commercial 
communication revenues in the market.21 
 Introducing another major change, law no. 6112 increased the cap on the ratio of 
foreign shareholding in radio and television enterprises. Under the previous law, a foreign 
investor could not own more than 25 per cent of the shares of a broadcasting enterprise and 
could not hold shares in more than one enterprise in Turkey. This provision had created a 
significant obstacle to the foreign capital that started to show interest in the Turkish media 
sector, and anyhow various methods were used to circumvent this ban. Article 19 paragraph 
(f) of the new law raised the cap on foreign capital share to 50 per cent and the number of 
media service provider enterprises that foreign investors could become shareholders of to 
two. 
 As a result of the liberalisation of the legal regime governing media ownership, 
between 2002 and 2008, 35 national and 30 international mergers and purchase transactions 
took place in the media sector. These transactions peaked in 2005 and 2006 (Sözeri, 2009). 
Editorial independence was never factored in the merger and acquisition process and, as a 
result, the media sales frequently led to layoffs. Following the sale of the daily Milliyet, a 
senior columnist and reporter of the paper commented on this reality: ‘Milliyet was sold like 
                                                            
20 This obstacle, which still exists in the new law, also receives criticism that the broadcasting ban on faculties 
of communication prevents news making, education and specialized broadcasting (İLAD, 2010). 
21 The law does not state how this share is to be calculated. A RTÜK official expressed that the three per cent 
share given to RTÜK by radio and television enterprises from their turnovers will be taken as a basis, hence 
allowing measurement of the 30 per cent limit through monthly regular metering. Minutes of the workshop on 
the topic of ‘the new legislation on the structure and authority of the Radio and Television Supreme Council’, 
Istanbul, 11/03/2011.  
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a refrigerator factory’ (Cemal, 2011). After the transfer of Star TV, one of the biggest 
national television channels in Turkey (from Doğan Group to Doğuş Group), about 15 
journalists were let go. According to the EU, the failure of the regulatory system to grant 
journalists social protection in cases of change of ownership is the main threat for media 
pluralism in Turkey (Leuven, et. al., 2009). 
 What makes the media sector attractive for investors is the media’s power to influence 
public opinion and gaining revenues from advertising. Not only does advertising provide the 
main source of income for media owners, but it also gives the commercial media its 
characteristic look and sound, and orients the content offered to the audience, who are also 
the commercial target that advertisers want to reach (Sinclair, 2006). Hence it is not possible 
to understand the ecosystem of the media in Turkey without an analysis of advertising 
expenditures and their distribution based on the subsectors and outlets that media owners 
invest in. 
 Advertising revenues have demonstrated a significant upward trend since 2002; they 
are expected to reach nearly 13 million USD by 2014. Considering that their ratio to GDP 
remains around 0.3 – 0.4 per cent, it is clear that advertising revenues have the potential to 
increase further. However, at the same time the media advertising pie is also far from being 
large enough. The most important reason for this is that television has a strong influence on 
public opinion in Turkey due to high ratings and the low costs of advertising. The share of 
television ads and the competition between television channels limit the growth of advertising 
revenues across all other media outlets and prevent a more balanced distribution of 
advertising shares. The second largest share in advertising revenues goes to the print media 
and subsectorally to newspapers. Competition in this sector takes place over advertising 
revenues rather than sales. However, due to the highly concentrated nature of the market, 
most newspapers cannot generate optimal advertising revenues and therefore operate in the 
red. The concentration is so high that two media groups (Doğan and Turkuvaz) dominate the 
market by 80 per cent. This duopoly is not only limited to the advertising revenues; the two 
media groups control the entire newspaper and magazine distribution sector excluding 
subscriptions. 
  The climate of deep political polarization in general and in the media in particular is 
also reflected in the advertising revenues. Newspapers have been more affected by this 
compared to other subsectors. A telling example of this phenomenon is daily Taraf, an 
independent newspaper notorious for its critical coverage of the military’s attempts to 
overthrow the government in the early 2000s. During its first two years, the newspaper 
operated under great financial difficulty due to its inability to get advertising from the private 
sector, which was reluctant to be associated with a newspaper deemed radical and militant by 
the establishment. While Taraf managed to survive, at present some companies shy from 
giving advertising to the paper for fear of damage to their commercial reputation.22 In order 
to overcome its financial problems and generate capital for its operation, Taraf is preparing to 
go public.   
 The advertising pie is almost entirely divided between the big media groups in all of 
the subsectors (except for cinema and outdoors) of the media. As indicated in Table 1 and 
Chart 1, the Turkish media market structure does not enable the oppositional and independent 
players to survive on sales or advertising revenues. Therefore, it can be argued that access to 
information is controlled by these big media groups. The consequences of this situation are 
less diversity and reduced journalistic quality (Shah, 2009). 
                                                            
22 Interview with Markar Esayan, Vice Chief Editor, daily Taraf, by Ceren Sözeri, Istanbul, 12/07/2011. 
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Table 1: 
Shares of Media Groups in Advertising Revenues (%) 
  TV Newspaper Magazine Radio Internet 
Doğan Group 36 58 30 8 20 
Çukurova Group 12 3 6 6 1 
Turkuvaz Medya Group 19 24 18 2 4 
Doğuş Group 8  4 9 7 
Ciner Group 2 1 3  2 
Other 23 14 39 75 66 
 Source: Mindshare, 2010 
 
While new technologies undoubtedly offer readers and audience new sources of 
information, this kind of pluralism does not necessarily provide diversity of viewpoints 
(Hindman, 2007; Dwyer, 2006). Neither do new media technologies offer a new solution to 
the control of media power (Lievrouw, 2004; Chesney, 2006; Almiron, 2010). The most 
important area where the traditional media outlets/venues converge is the Internet and, more 
recently, the mobile communication sector. Today, the traditional media also operates on the 
Internet and there are news outlets that only operate on this channel. However, the advertising 
based business model continues to be the most used model for all online news organisations. 
In 2009, Internet advertising revenues in Turkey were 182 million TL according to the 
Advertisers’ Association, and 120 million EUR according to the IAB Europe Adex Report. 
As in many other countries, the big share goes to international giants such as Google, 
Facebook, Yahoo, MSN. As a result, the advertising revenues that feed the online news 
organisations are inadequate to create a self-sufficient and independent online media which 
could offer an alternative to the concentrated mainstream media. 
 The blurring of the boundaries between the media, information technologies and 
telecommunication accentuates the essential nature of the relationship between the media 
organs and telecommunication companies (Barr, 2006). Türk Telekom, the largest 
telecommunication company and the single fixed telephone operator in Turkey which owns 
the infrastructure for all distribution networks, all telephone exchanges and transmission 
channels, has moved into the area of media content in recent years. At present, the company 
has games and music portals in addition to a web TV service and IPTV platform. Türk 
Telekom has transformed itself into one of the biggest players of the media sector, and, 
considering the advantages it has, this situation has adverse effects for competition and 
diversity of content in the Turkish media. 
 Problems caused by the competitive advantages of Türk Telekom have occasionally 
been carried to the agenda of the Competition Authority. Officials of the authority point out 
that their sanctioning powers are limited under the existing legislation, and that social support 
is needed for pushing the development of more effective competition regulations. Members 
of the Radio and Television Broadcasters Professional Union (Radyo ve Televizyon 
Yayıncıları Meslek Birliği), on the other hand, indicate that they cannot criticize Türk 
Telekom’s position in the market because it is one of the biggest advertisers for TV 
operators.23 
                                                            
23 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Investment and competition relations in the media sector: the 
present and the future of the sector,’ Istanbul, 21/04/ 2011.  
 16
3.2 Competition  
Besides having its specific legal regulations, the media sector is also subject to the regulations 
of the Competition Law and the supervision of the Competition Authority.  One should note 
here that Law on the Protection of Competition (no. 4054) has been in effect in Turkey since 
1994, and it is in compliance with the EU’s competition rules set out in Articles 81-82 of the 
Treaty of Rome. In other words, the Competition Law was enacted as part of the EU 
harmonization process. However, until 2000, the Competition Authority was inactive 
regarding cases concerning the Turkish media sector (Pekman, 2002). 
 Under Law no. 4054, in examining applications concerning the media, the Competition 
Authority is required to assess whether basic rules of competition have been violated, a 
dominant position in the market has been created, and, if so, whether such dominant position 
has been abused. The Competition Authority has issued several decisions concerning the 
protection of competition in the media markets. ‘The infringements of competition’ (50 per 
cent) and ‘merger-acquisition and privatization’ (33 per cent) constituted the major grounds of 
the decisions issued between 2008 and 2010. One of these decisions concerned the Doğan 
Group. On 5 April 2011, the authority sentenced the group’s companies to a fine of 
approximately 6 million TL (2,5 million EUR) and another subsidiary media company to a 
fine of 444 thousand TL (186 thousand EUR) on the grounds that it abused its dominant 
position in the media through offering discounts in advertising sales and making agreements 
with media planning agencies.24 Considering particularly the high concentrated market 
structure of the newspaper sector, such infringements of competition rules can be a fatal risk 
for the small and independent players and thereby endanger freedom of expression and 
pluralism in the media.  
 The new Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) regards the share of commercial 
communication, advertising revenues and other sponsorships as a criterion for protecting 
competition and preventing monopolization in the media markets. This provision prevents a 
media organization from getting more than 30 per cent of all commercial communication 
revenues in the market. How this limitation will be put into practice is somewhat vague in the 
law. Radio and television broadcasters and the Competition Authority foresee potential 
problems in the implementation of this provision, and propose instead the effective 
implementation of existent legal limitations on ownership and control.25  
 
3.3 State intervention 
In Turkey there are no direct subsidies for commercial broadcasting companies. The official 
advertisements and announcements distributed by BİK are important sources of revenue for 
small, independent and local press outlets, which are economically vulnerable vis-à-vis the 
existing media market structure.  
The way in which state advertisings are allocated and its implications for state 
intervention in the media have recently become a topic of public debate when the owner of 
Apoyevmatini, a weekly of the Greek community, announced his decision to close down the 
paper due to the sharp decline in its advertising and sales revenues.26 In making this 
announcement at a public conference, Mihail Vasiliadis noted the government’s refusal to 
                                                            
24 The decision is available at http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/tefhim/tefhim67.pdf (date accessed 6 
December 2011). 
25 Notes of the workshop on the topic of ‘investment and competition relations in the media sector: the present 
and the future of the sector,’ Istanbul, 21/04/2011.  
26 The principal reason for the decline was the economic crisis in Greece.  
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give state advertising to minority newspapers as a factor in the financial difficulties of his 
paper. The public reaction resulted in the President of BέK meeting with Vasiliadis and 
subsequently with representatives of all other newspapers belonging to Greek Orthodox, 
Armenian and Jewish communities. The outcome of these meetings was an ad hoc decision 
by BέK to allocate a one-time payment of a total of 250,000 TL to six minority newspapers 
(Turkish Press, 2011).27 While a significant relief for their financial difficulties, the decision 
fell short of meeting the expectations of minority newspapers for a formal commitment of 
state advertising. In explaining why it was not able to do so, BέK cited the legal obstacles 
stemming from the decision no. 67 of its general assembly, which lays out the conditions for 
state advertising. Pursuant to these regulations, newspapers eligible for state advertising must 
be published on a daily basis, must employ at least seven staff, and have a minimum of eight 
pages and a circulation of 5 thousand, criteria which minority newspapers are unable to fulfil. 
While BέK promised to revisit the regulations to develop a solution for the minority media, 
the agency is concerned that the softening of the rules would lead to abuse by individuals 
who would claim state support for ‘one-page “newspaper” ’ (Bianet, 2011). At a workshop 
organized for this research project, this sentiment was echoed by a high level BέK official, 
who pointed out that among recipients of state advertising are ‘newspapers’ where nepotism 
plays a great role in the hiring of individuals without journalism background simply because 
they are family members or friends of the owner.28  
 
3.4 Public service broadcasting 
TRT, established in 1964, is the sole public service broadcaster in Turkey. It owns 15 
television (five international, nine national, one regional) and nine radio channels. A 1971 
amendment to law no. 1568 put an end to the autonomy TRT had enjoyed since its 
establishment. Article 133 of the 1982 Constitution restructured TRT as an impartial public 
corporate body. The Radio and Television Law (no.2954) centralized the organisational 
structure of the body, removing representatives of academia, NGOs and professional 
organisations from the TRT board (Cankaya, 2008). Today, the Administrative Board is the 
highest decision-making and management organ of the corporation. Members serve a four-
year term. The Director General, who is also the Head of Administrative Board, is appointed 
for a four-year term by the Cabinet from among three candidates nominated by RTÜK. The 
Cabinet appoints two members of the Administrative Board from among the vice directors, 
and the remaining four from candidates nominated by RTÜK from fields of electronics or 
mass communication, law, business administration or economics, arts and culture. 
 TRT is funded by a combination of public and commercial revenues. The major 
sources of funding are: a broadcasting (licence) fee generated from the sale of television and 
radio receivers, music sets and VTRs; two per cent of electricity bills paid by each consumer; 
and a share allocated from the national budget.  
 Following the abolishment of its monopoly with the launch of private broadcasting in 
1993, the public broadcaster has had to compete with commercial televisions and radio 
channels for the advertising revenues and its advertising income decreased about 50 per cent  
A few years later, 87,1 per cent of advertising revenues was held by private broadcasters 
(Erdemir, 2011). TRT also found itself in a ratings race with its commercial rivals. In 2010, 
                                                            
27 These publications are are: Apoyevmatini (weekly) and έho (daily) of the Greek orthodox community, alom 
(weekly) of the Jewish community, Jamanak (daily), Marmara (daily) and Agos (weekly) of the Armenian 
community. 
28 An official at BİK, notes of the workshop on the topic of ‘human resources problems and the future of the 
media sector’, Ankara, 18/12/ 2010.  
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TRT withdrew its channels from the rating system run by AGB Nielsen accusing the latter of 
‘violating competition regulations’ (Zaman, 2010). It was clear that TRT was disturbed by 
the potential negative impact of low ratings on its advertising revenues. 
 These competitive moves by TRT have been criticized on the grounds of being in 
contradiction with public service philosophy and the social function of the agency (Cankaya, 
2008). On the other hand, the commercialisation of the broadcasting environment revealed 
consumer dissatisfaction with TRT’s services. Although it provided a mixed programming 
with an emphasis on entertainment, TRT maintained a distinctly paternalistic and elitist 
approach and observed strict codes that sometimes amounted to censorship (Çatalbaş, 2003). 
As a result, TRT’s financing system and revenues have been questioned because of ‘its 
permanent endorsement of the official position of the state and/or government on almost any 
subject ... and careful avoidance from any engagement with controversial issues’ (Barış, 
2005: 296). 
 
3.5 The impact of EU integration  
The media policies in Turkey have undergone significant change as a result of the 
liberalization of the media and foreign investors’ entry into the market. Laws which used to 
regulate public service broadcasting now focus on regulating commercial publishing, 
protecting competition and preventing monopolization. Behind this change lie the rapid 
improvements in information and communication technologies and the need to align 
Turkey’s media regulations with those of the EU. The impact of the EU integration on media 
policy making was perhaps most visible in the recent enactment of Law no. 6112. In 
preparing the draft, Turkish policy makers strived to develop a text in harmony with the EU’s 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). Indeed, the new law, which is much more 
comprehensive than the former (law no.3984) and also covers new technology broadcasters 
(such as on-demand service providers), appears to be in harmony with AVMSD in terms of 
scope, access and regulation of commercial communication. However, the law also requires 
radio broadcasting to be in compliance with Article 133 of the Constitution.29   
 The greatest criticism to the new law is that it focuses too much on commercial 
communication and ignores the public service dimension of the media. Unlike in AVMSD, 
the excessively-detailed broadcasting principles laid out with ambiguous wording provide 
potential loopholes to limit freedom of expression (Sümer and Adaklı, 2011). When 
preparing the new law, the opinions of professional radio and TV broadcasting organizations 
were gathered, and the draft law was presented to the public on RTÜK’s website. However, 
some academics and non-governmental organizations stated that while their views were 
indeed sought, they were not reflected in the eventual text, and that the law regulates only 
commercial broadcasting rather than ensuring the freedom and diversity of the media. Critics 
point out that neither the consultative drafting process nor the fact that the law is in 
compliance with AVMSD are sufficient to render it a democratic piece of legislation.30 
 
 
                                                            
29 This expansive scope of the law and the effort to regulate radio broadcasting with primarily television focused 
regulations are points of criticism. Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the structure 
and authority of the Radio and Television Supreme Council’, Istanbul, 11/03/2011. 
30 Ankara University, Faculty of Communication, Opinion on the draft broadcasting law. Also, minutes of the 
workshop on the topic of ‘the new legislation on the structure and authority of the Radio and Television 
Supreme Council’, Istanbul, 11/03/2011.   
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4. Composition and diversification of media content 
Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and protects individuals from 
state interference on expression of their opinions. Article 28 protects freedom of the press and 
imposes on the state a positive obligation to undertake the requisite measures to ensure the 
exercise of this freedom. The Constitution guarantees the right to declare or disseminate 
opinions individually or collectively and to access and share information and opinions 
without state interference.  
What lies beyond this liberal façade, however, is a framework where nationalism, 
statism and cultural conservatism emerge as the supreme values looming over individual 
rights. The exercise of fundamental freedoms is subject to compliance with, inter alia, 
national security, national unity and state secrets.31 The Constitution entrusts the state with 
the duty to make sure that citizens act and think in accordance with the ideals of Atatürk, the 
values of the nation and the morals of the family. Article 41 identifies the family as the 
‘foundation of the Turkish society’ and tasks the state with taking measures to protect ‘the 
peace and welfare of the family’ and to protect children against all kinds of abuse and 
violence. Article 58 allots the duty to protect the youth against abuse, exploitation and ‘bad 
habits’ such as alcoholism, drugs and gambling to the state, and as well as the responsibility 
to raise young people in accordance with ‘the principles and revolutions of Atatürk.’ Making 
note of this ‘state-centrist approach,’ the Council of Europe (CoE) Commissioner for Human 
Rights pointed out the pervasive recognition ‘that the letter and spirit of the present Turkish 
Constitution represent a major obstacle to the effective protection of pluralism and freedom 
of expression’  (Hammarberg, 2011: para. 11).  
 
4.1 Media specific laws 
The laws governing media content are drafted in the same spirit of nationalism and 
conservatism embraced in the Constitution. Despite relatively improved through the EU 
process, media laws contain restrictions based on principles of national unity, national 
security, and the reforms and principles of Atatürk.32 While these laws do pay lip service to 
freedom of the press and freedom of expression, the latter are secondary to the protection of 
the state and its founding principles.  
The Press Law protects freedom of the press, the right to information, and the right of 
reply to defamatory or untruthful news. While the law guarantees journalists’ right to protect 
their news sources, it does not ‘include a strong public interest for the protection of 
journalists’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para. 30).  At the same time, the law restricts these freedoms 
on grounds of ‘national security,’ ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘state secrets.’ Article 11 attributes 
criminal liability to editors and translators of written work in cases where the author is abroad 
or unidentified.  
                                                            
31 The restrictions on the press are laid out in Art. 26 of the Constitution: ‘The exercise of these freedoms may 
be restricted for the purposes of protecting national security, public order and public safety, the basic 
characteristics of the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, 
preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified as a state secret, protecting the 
reputation and rights and private  and family life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by 
law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the judiciary.’ These restrictions are enforced through rigorous 
measures, including the confiscation of the print media. Art. 28.  
32 Examples of such interdictions in laws governing media content: ‘the existence and independence of the 
Turkish Republic, the territorial and national integrity of the State, the reforms and principles of Atatürk’ 
(Broadcasting Law, Art. 8); ‘national security’ and ‘territorial integrity’ (Press Law, Art. 3); ‘crimes against 
Atatürk’ (Internet Law, Art. 8).     
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The new Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) ‘brings only partial improvement’ in 
expanding media freedom (European Commission, 2011: 27). It comprises a wide catalogue 
of restrictions, going well beyond the EU Directive which the law claims to be in compliance 
with. While the directive cites the protection of children and prevention of hate speech as the 
only grounds for content restriction, the law restricts content on grounds of, inter alia, ‘the 
national and moral values of society, general morality and the protection of the family.’33 
That the state defines broadcasting principles in punitive laws rather than enabling the media 
to develop its own values is criticized as an infringement of freedom of expression and 
freedom of the press.34 A further criticism is the conservative nature of the values endorsed in 
the Broadcasting Law, evident in the exclusion of sexual orientation as a ground of 
discrimination.35  
The amorphous concepts such as ‘general morality,’ ‘the protection of the family,’ 
and ‘the national and moral values of society’ that the law embraces as broadcasting 
principles leave RTÜK with a wide margin of manoeuvre. The agency has the powers to 
sanction the media with warnings, monetary and administrative sanctions, suspensions and 
revocation of licences.36 In the past, under the previous more restrictive version of the 
Broadcasting Law (no.3984), RTÜK had imposed heavy sanctions against dissident and 
minority media.37 However, these sanctions by and large remained out of the limelight of 
wider public opinion. It was sanctions against popular TV series aired on television stations 
in recent years that generated widespread public debate. During the first half of 2011, RTÜK 
issued warnings and imposed fines against television stations on grounds of disrespect of 
historical characters (Önderoğlu, 2011),38 broadcasting homosexual scenes (Gazeteciler.com, 
2011),39 the use of ‘poor Turkish and slang’ and the use of alcohol (Söylemez, 2011).40 
During July, August and September 2011 alone, RTÜK issued 16 monetary fines and 96 
warnings against one radio station and 109 TV channels (Gülcan, 2011). 
The sanctions received mixed reactions. On one hand, the followers of the series 
initiated campaigns via social media,41 while human rights groups protested RTÜK for 
discrimination against LGBT individuals (Amargi, 2011; Belge, 2011). On the other hand, it 
was the social pressure from the audience, the government and conservative political parties 
that mobilized RTÜK in the first place. The agency received 74,911 complaints about the 
series on the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman in only three weeks, which amounted to 93 per cent 
of all complaints filed during that period (Önderoğlu, 2011). The criticisms expressed by 
Bülent Arınç, the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the press, TRT, the Anatolian Agency 
                                                            
33 Broadcasting Law (no. 6112), Art. 8.  
34 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘The new legislation on the structure and authority of the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council’, Istanbul, 11/03/2011.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Law no. 6112, Art. 32 and 33.  
37 For example, RTÜK suspended the broadcasting of local, regional and national operators for a total of 3,132 
days in 2001. On 8 February 2002 alone, the agency suspended the broadcasting of 18 national and local media 
operators for a total of 128 days.  
38 RTÜK issued a warning to SHOW TV for having portrayed the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman as a man fond of 
women and alcohol in the series Magnificent Centur.  
39 In March 2011, RTÜK initiated proceedings against Digiturk, a cable television company, for having 
broadcasted a gay marriage scene in the movie Sex and the City 2. The agency based the proceedings on the 
violation of ‘national and moral value and Turkish family structure.’  
40 RTÜK issued a warning to STAR TV because of the use of slang and alcohol in the series Behzat Ç. The 
warning was issued because of the alleged negative influence of the series on children and youth.  
41 For example, followers of Behzat Ç. initiated a campaign on Twitter, which ‘rocketed to first place in the 
section of “trends” in Turkey’ (Gülcan, 2011). 
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and various nationalist and Islamist parties further increased the pressure on RTÜK 
(Üstündağ, 2011).  
There were also occasions where RTÜK resorted to its powers to sanction 
discrimination against minorities. The agency suspended a women’s show on ATV, a 
national television station, on grounds of ‘inciting people to revenge and hatred.’ The 
sanction was imposed after the host of the program criticized the Kurdish population of Van, 
a province badly hit by an earthquake in October 2011, for seeking rescue from the same 
police that they ‘had thrown stones at’ during mass demonstrations (Ertürk, 2011).  
The Internet Law (no. 5651) of 2007 regulates content providers, domain providers, 
access providers and collective usage providers.42 The law authorizes the banning of access to 
websites where there are sufficient reasons for a ‘suspicion’ that the following crimes 
enumerated in Article 8 are committed: incitement to suicide; sexual exploitation and abuse 
of children; facilitating the use of drugs; obscenity; prostitution; arranging a place or facility 
for gambling; and crimes defined in the Law on Crimes Committed against Atatürk (no. 
5816). The appertain procedural regulation sets forth principles that publications on the 
Internet must adhere to, in addition to respect for human dignity and fundamental rights, the 
protection of the physical, mental and moral development of youth and children, and respect 
for the peace and welfare of the family.43 According to the Internet Law, access can be 
blocked by a judge (at the investigation phase), a court (at the prosecution phase) or by TİB 
where the content provider is outside of Turkey or where the content concerns sexual abuse 
of children or obscenity.  
Domestic experts point out that the legal grounds for blocking access to the Internet 
are ambiguous; that blocking orders are usually issued on the basis of a domain name, and as 
a consequence, block access to all content included under that name, and that in cases where 
the content provider or domain provider is abroad, TİB orders can be executed without the 
approval of a judge or a court.44 International experts point out that ‘[E]ven if it is legitimate 
to remove some content, such as child pornography and hate speech inciting to violence from 
the internet, the blocking of internet sites often results in the blocking of content which has 
nothing to do with child pornography or hate speech inciting to violence’ (Hammarberg, 
2011a). The issue was eventually taken to the ECtHR, where four petitions challenged the 
bans on Youtube and Google. While the government is in the process of preparing 
amendments to the Internet Law, the content of the possible changes have not yet been 
disclosed to the public. 
Both the TİB and the courts do not hesitate from resorting to their sanctioning powers 
under the Internet Law. So far, 80 per cent of the decisions to ban access have been issued by 
the TİB, and the rest by a judge or a court. According to a source which keeps track of 
blocked websites, as of 5 November 2011, a total of 15,486 websites are blocked in Turkey 
(engelliweb.com, 2011). The most recent orders were issued by TİB on 25 October 2011 
                                                            
42 İnternet Ortamında Yapılan Yayınların Düzenlenmesi ve Bu Yayınlar Yoluyla İşlenen Suçlarla Mücadele 
Edilmesi Hakkında Kanun [Law on the Regulation of Broadcasts on the Internet and on Combatting Crimes 
Committed through the Internet], no. 5651, 4 May 2007, Official Gazette, no. 26530, 23 May 2007. 
43 İnternet Ortamında Yapılan Yayınların Düzenlenmesine Dair Usul ve Esaslar Hakkında Yönetmelik 
[Regulation on the Procedures and Substance of the Regulation of Broadcasts on the Internet], Official Gazette, 
No. 26716, 30 November 2007, Art. 4(1).  
44 5651 Sayılı Kanun Çerçevesinde Erişim Engelleme Kararları [Decisions of Access Bans within the 
Framework of Law no. 5651], available at: 
http://www.internethukuk.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=77:5651-sayl-kanun-
cercevesinde-eriim-engelleme-kararlar&catid=34:genel-kategori&Itemid=50 (date accessed 21 December 
2011). 
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against seven websites, all of which were about transgender individuals. While the catalogue 
crimes enumerated under the Internet Law are the only legal grounds for blocking access to 
the Internet, in practice blocking orders have also been based on the Anti-Terror Law, other 
provisions of the Turkish Penal Code, such as Article 301, and intellectual property rights 
(Hammarberg, 2011: para.62).45 
  In February 2011, BTK released a decision titled the ‘safe usage of the Internet,’ 
requiring service providers to propose the option to use one of four packages to their 
customers: family package, children package, standard package and domestic package (BTK, 
2011). The decision was perceived as yet another attempt to restrict civil liberties and to 
render ‘censorship widespread and systematic’ (Altıparmak and Akdeniz, 2011). 50,000 
individuals organized through the social media held a public protest against the measure, 
while the Communication Foundation and Bianet applied to the Council of State (Danıştay) 
for a stay of execution. On 12 March 2011, the World Day against Cyber-Censorship, Turkey 
was included among the ‘Enemies of the Internet’ (Reporters without Borders, 2011). 
According to the OSCE, if enforced, the filtering system ‘will lead to the first government 
controlled and maintained mandatory filtering system within the OSCE region’ (Akdeniz, 
2011: 26).  
Visibly concerned, particularly with the international reaction, BTK argued that the 
measure did not constitute filtering because consumers were provided with a choice 
(Altıparmak and Akdeniz, 2011a). Yet, faced with growing criticism, the agency revised its 
decision in August 2011, reducing the number of packages to two (family package and child 
package) and making Internet filters optional and applicable upon demand (BTK, 2011a). 
Following a three months trial period, the new filtering system came into effect on 22 
November 2011. BTK’s revision of its earlier decision failed to put an end to the heated 
debate about Internet censorship in Turkey. Some point out that ‘the introduction of this 
system … will lead to a DPI [deep packet inspection]-based monitoring and blocking system’ 
(Kırlıdoğ, 2011).   
What was striking about the terms of the public debate was the mismatch between the 
discourse of the protestors and the BTK. While the former criticized the filtering system as an 
infringement on freedom of communication and privacy rights, the latter sought to legitimize 
the measure on the basis of moral values and the protection of children. The principal reason 
for the strong public reaction against BTK was the fact that the measure was perceived as yet 
another effort of censorship in a country where excessively strong and arbitrary barriers to 
Internet access had been causing public outrage. In April 2011, TİB had informed Internet 
hosting companies of the banning of 138 words deemed to indicate illegal content from 
domain names. The list included words used in daily life, such as ‘animal’ as well as words 
deemed inappropriate by the agency, such as ‘gay.’ TİB pointed out that the failure to comply 
could result in punitive sanctions. Soon after, the agency took the matters in its own hands 
and ordered the hosting providers of a popular dictionary website (www.eksisozluk.com) and 
the LGBT association Pembe Hayat (http://pembehayat.org/) to stop providing services to 
these websites.  
 While Turkey has adopted a Right to Information Act in 2004, public agencies often 
resist providing information to citizens and civil society, in blatant disregard of their 
obligations. Despite decisions by the Right to Information Review Council and administrative 
courts, ‘there is still resistance to give information, and a high number of public authorities 
                                                            
45 An example of this was the independent media website www.istanbul.indymedia.org, which was blocked in 
2008 for having insulted Turkishness in violation of Article 301 of the Penal Code.  
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are disputing Council decisions, either by ignoring them, or by appealing to administrative 
courts to challenge such decisions’ (Akdeniz, 2008).  
 
4.2 Penal laws 
The principal obstacles to freedom of press and freedom of expression in Turkey stem from 
the criminal legal system. The Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law are ‘at the origin of the 
vast majority of freedom of expression cases against Turkey brought to the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para.15). The following offences under the Penal 
Code provide the legal basis for cases against the media organs, journalists and human rights 
defenders: defamation (Article 125); setting up criminal organisations for the overthrow of 
the constitutional order (Article 314); encouraging military personnel to disobey the law 
(Article 319); discouraging individuals from military service (Article 318); insulting the 
Turkish nation, state, parliament, government or the courts (Article 301); incitement to crime 
(Article 214); praising a crime or criminals (Article 215); incitement to hatred or animosity 
(Article 216); and publishing or broadcasting obscene material (Article 226).46  
 High level officials, including the Prime Minister, brought defamation cases against 
journalists criticising the government. In 2010, 11 journalists were among the 14 individuals 
who were sentenced to a total of 11 years and four months of imprisonment and 
approximately 10 million Euros in fines in defamation cases (BIA, 2010). Prosecutors are 
making increasing use of the Penal Code to decisively censor the media by penalising them 
for reporting on issues such as criminal cases against high ranking military officers. Recently, 
criminal cases are brought under Article 285 (breaching the confidentiality of investigations) 
and Article 288 (attempting to unduly influence the courts) against journalists who cover 
cases where military officers are accused of having committed crimes against the state. These 
two provisions ‘have come to particular prominence since 2007, due to a steep increase in 
cases brought against journalists in connection with their writings on the Ergenekon case’ 
(Hammarberg, 2011: para.20). The European Commission noted that there were more than 
4,000 ongoing investigations on the basis of these two provisions (EC, 2010: 20). The draft 
law submitted by the Ministry of Justice for an amendment of the Penal Code, including 
Articles 285 and 288 (EC, 2011: 26), has not yet been taken up for review by the parliament. 
Neither has it been disclosed to the public. Another provision that the prosecutors refer to for 
censoring the press is Article 318, which makes the non-violent expression of views on 
conscientious objection a criminal offence and the publication of these views in the media an 
aggravating factor. The provision has caused the conviction of journalists for simply 
reporting on conscientious objectors who refuse to serve in the army.  
 The most widely debated and criticised provision of the penal code has been Article 
301, largely due to the high profile cases brought against intellectuals such as the Nobel 
laureate Orhan Pamuk. Amidst growing international pressure, the government amended, but 
did not abolish, the provision such that prosecution in each individual case is now subject to 
prior authorisation of the Minister of Justice. While this amendment has indeed decreased the 
number of proceedings launched under this provision, it has still been found inadequate by 
the human rights community. The ECtHR put an end to the debates on Article 301, finding in 
the case of Akçam v. Turkey that the article is in violation of the European Convention (see 
section 4.2). 
                                                            
46 While the law was drafted anew in the name of harmonizing national laws with the EU’s acquis, for some 
offences it merely re-numbered and re-worded provisions contained in the previous penal code. For example, 
Articles 215, 216, 301 and 318 of the new Penal Code regulate the same offences as Article 312, 159 and 155 of 
the previous law. 
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 The Anti-Terror Law (no. 3713), as amended in 2006, has restrictive provisions 
curtailing freedom of the press. Article 6(2) makes it an offence to print or publish 
declarations or leaflets of terrorist organisations, punishable by one to three years of 
imprisonment. Under Article 6(4), where such offence is committed through the press or the 
media, the owners and editors-in-chief of the media organ in question are also charged with 
imprisonment up to ten thousand days. Article 6(5) allows the suspension of periodicals for a 
period of 15 days up to one month by court order or the prosecutor in cases where delay is 
detrimental. Article 7(2) makes it an offence to disseminate propaganda in favour of a 
terrorist organisation, subject from one to five years of imprisonment. Where such offence is 
committed through the media, the sentence is increased by half. The article also imposes 
liability to the owners and editors-in-chief of the press and media organs concerned.  
 
4.3 National courts  
The track record of Turkish high courts in cases involving freedom of expression and 
freedom of media has been extremely poor. In civil cases, high courts tend to go against the 
established ECtHR case law by ruling in favour of plaintiffs who bring defamation cases 
against intellectuals and public personalities. In March 2011, the High Court of Appeals 
sentenced Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk to pay around a 2,500 Euro fine for having ‘violated 
the personalities’ of plaintiffs for having stated in an interview that the Turks ‘killed 30,000 
Kurds and one million Armenians.’ The judgment raised deep concerns that it would open the 
gate to a flood of defamation cases against Pamuk and any others who express opinions 
contradicting Turkey’s official narrative on the Kurdish question and the Armenian genocide.  
 In criminal cases, too, high courts are heavy-handed against individuals who are 
convicted for merely expressing non-violent dissenting opinions and/or reporting on political 
issues deemed to be ‘against state interests.’ While ‘prosecutors appear to exercise little 
restraint in filing criminal cases, including clearly unmeritorious cases’ (Hammarberg, 2011: 
para.50), judges do not sufficiently scrutinize whether cases have sufficient merit but readily 
issue admissibility decisions. Courts loosely interpret the Anti-Terror Law and the Penal 
Code in convicting individuals who express non-violent opinions on the situation of the 
Kurdish minority or the armed conflict between the army and the PKK (Hammarberg, 2011: 
para.20). They show an extreme reluctance to draw a distinction between reporting on 
terrorism and terrorist propaganda, regarding instead ‘media outlets reporting about sensitive 
issues ... as the publishing organs of illegal organizations’ (OSCE, 2011).  
  The Turkish Constitutional Court’s case law on freedom of the press and expression is 
also problematic. The Court has declined to review restrictive criminal laws, even when the 
head of the executive branch has called on it to do so. In a case brought by the former 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer on the grounds that the suspension of the future publications 
and distribution of a periodical infringed upon freedom of the press, the Constitutional Court 
found Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law to be compatible with the Constitution and rejected 
the request for annulment (Constitutional Court, 2009). Where the parliament adopted 
progressive legal reforms in accordance with the ECHR standards, on the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court overturned such changes. On 2 May 2011, the Constitutional Court 
invalidated Article 26 of the Press Law, which imposes time limits on prosecutors for 
launching criminal cases. Once this decision enters into force in July 2012, prosecutors will 
no longer be bound to certain time restraints if they want to file a case about a publication in 
a periodical. Currently, the maximum period for filing a case is two months after publication 
for dailies and four months for weeklies. 
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 Pre-trial detention is extremely long in Turkey. Journalists, like other defendants, are 
detained on remand for such lengthy periods that detention time turns into punishment. 
Journalists are often convicted for multiple offences with extremely heavy sentences, facing 
life sentences without parole. In 2010, 33 individuals were sentenced to a total of 365 years 
of imprisonment under the Anti-Terror Law (BIA, 2010: 1). The editor-in-chief of the 
Kurdish-language daily Azadiya Welat was sentenced to 166 years of imprisonment. In 2010 
alone, this newspaper was suspended thrice for one month each. These sanctions were 
imposed notwithstanding a ECtHR judgment which found the suspending of future 
publications of periodicals, whose content remained to be seen, to be in violation of the 
European Convention and called upon the government to revise Article 6(5) of the Anti-
Terror Law. Drawing attention to the gap between the ECtHR case law and the judgments of 
national courts, the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights stated that ‘there is no indication 
that domestic courts, when deciding on freedom of expression cases, systematically assess 
whether the content of journalistic reporting is true, and if so, whether the public has a 
legitimate interest in and a right to obtain the information in question (the so-called defences 
of truth and public interest)’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para.37). 
 Perhaps no other criminal case launched against journalists has resulted in as strong a 
reaction as the detention in March 2011 of journalists Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık on 
charges of ‘incitement to hatred and animosity’47 and ‘membership of a terrorist 
organization.’ While, prior to this incident, hundreds of journalists working in media 
associated with the Kurdish and revolutionary left movements had been prosecuted, the 
detention of these two renowned investigative journalists working for the mainstream media 
led to an unprecedented public debate around a criminal case involving the media in Turkey. 
The incident has not only given rise to protests by different segments of the media and 
society, but also shattered the public’s faith in the Ergenekon case. The subsequent 
confiscation by the police of the unpublished manuscripts of Ahmet Şık’s book48 has further 
intensified the debate on media freedom. The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights 
expressed deep concern ‘about the decision of the prosecutors and courts to seize copies of an 
unpublished manuscript, which has serious chilling effects on freedom of expression, of the 
press and of publication’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para.49). 
The cases brought against journalists drew fierce criticism from the international 
community. Various international organizations such as the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),49 the European Federation of Journalists50 and the CoE  
(Hammarberg, 2011) pointed out the gravity of the situation and called on the government to 
take the requisite measures to ensure press freedom. The European Parliament issued a very 
critical report on 9 March 2011, naming cases against journalists as ‘police or judicial 
harassment’ and expressing concern about ‘the deterioration in freedom of the press, about 
certain acts of censorship and about growing self-censorship within the Turkish media, 
including on the Internet’ (European Parliament, 2011: para.8). The Turkish Prime Minister 
rebuked the report as biased and subjective, stating that the imprisoned journalists were 
                                                            
47 This charge was subsequently dropped. Currently, the two journalists are solely charged with ‘membership to 
the Ergenekon terrorist organization’. 
48 Titled İmamın Ordusu (The Army of the İmam), the book is about the alleged links between the Fethullah 
Gülen movement and the police in Turkey. 
49 On 4 April 2011, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media made a written statement, calling upon 
Turkish authorities to bring the regulations governing journalism in line with the OSCE’s standards on media 
freedom (OSCE, Statement, 2011).  The annex of the statement contained the names of 57 imprisoned 
journalists (OSCE, Annex, 2011). 
50 The European Federation for Journalists launched a campaign titled ‘Set Turkish Journalists Free,’ available 
at:  http://europe.ifj.org/fr/pages/turkey-campaign-set-journalists-free (date accessed 21 November 2011). 
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behind the bars not because of their journalistic activities but ‘because of their relations with 
terrorist organizations, and their attempts to topple the government.’      
 
4.4 The ECtHR on media freedom in Turkey 
The obstacles to media freedom stemming from the Broadcasting Law (no. 3984) were raised 
for the first time before the ECtHR in the case of Özgür Radyo.51 The ECtHR found that the 
warnings and licence suspensions imposed by RTÜK violated Article 10 ECHR. The Court 
stated that the statements at issue did not incite violence or hatred but covered questions of 
general interest that had already been published by other media without being prosecuted. 
This judgment did not prevent RTÜK from issuing similar sanctions. In October 2010, the 
ECtHR found such a sanction to be arbitrary and in violation of freedom of the press.52  
 Recently, the ECtHR’s judgments have had some positive impact on media content 
regulation. The new Broadcasting Law (no. 6112) increased the legal threshold for the 
suspension of broadcasting, introducing monetary fines instead, and making the fine 
proportional to the size of the company. However, as discussed earlier, the new law maintains 
more or less the same subjective, unclear and open grounds for sanctioning broadcasters, on 
the basis of which RTÜK continues to operate.  
 The vast majority of cases on media freedom and freedom of expression brought to 
the ECtHR are decisions based on the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. In the case of 
Ürper and Others, the Court scrutinised Article 6(5) of the Anti-Terror Law,53 concluding 
that the banning of the future publication of entire newspapers, whose content was yet 
unknown, had a chilling effect on applicants, dissuading them from publishing similar news 
in the future, and thus constituted censorship. The ECtHR issued a similar judgment in the 
case of Turgay and Others.54 The ECtHR also took note of the fact that the Constitutional 
Court of Turkey had not taken into account the Ürper and Others judgment in its 
jurisprudence on media freedom. Concerning paragraph 2 of Article 6, the ECtHR held that 
the applicants’ criminal conviction for having published statements of illegal organisations 
and their members violated Article 10 of the Convention.55  
 Two recent ECtHR decisions in particular caused major embarrassment for the 
Turkish government, which had argued that the amended version of Article 301 would 
prevent arbitrary prosecutions for non-violent opinions. In the case of Dink v. Turkey, the 
Court found a violation of Article 10 ECHR on account of Hrant Dink’s conviction for 
‘insulting Turkishness’ in his article published in the Armenian-Turkish weekly Agos.56 Dink 
was an Armenian journalist who was portrayed as an enemy of the Turks and turned into an 
object of hatred by the national media on account of his conviction and who was 
subsequently assassinated. The murder of Dink created such a strong protest that the 
government was compelled to amend (but not abolish) Article 301, requiring prior written 
authorization by the Minister of Justice for the launch of a case. This amendment, too, failed 
to prevent further defeat in Strasbourg. On 25 October 2011, in the case of Akçam v. Turkey, 
the ECtHR held that ‘the safeguards put in place by the legislator to prevent the abusive 
application of Article 301 by the judiciary do not provide a reliable and continuous guarantee 
                                                            
51 ECtHR, Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 64178/00, 64179/00, 
64181/00, 64183/00, 64184/00), 30 June 2006. 
52 ECtHR, Nur Radyo ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 42284/05), 12 October 2010. 
53  ECtHR, Ürper and Others v. Turkey (nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 47245/07, 
50371/07, 50372/07 and 54637/07), 20 October 2009. 
54 ECtHR, Turgay and Others v. Turkey (no. 8306/08, 8340/08 and 8366/08), 15 June 2010. 
55 ECtHR, Gözel and Özer v. Turkey (no. 43453/04 and 31098/05), 6 July 2010. 
56 ECtHR, Dink v. Turkey (no. 2668/07, 6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09 and 7124/09), 14 September 2010. 
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or remove the risk of being directly affected by the provision because any political change in 
time might affect the interpretative attitudes of the Ministry of Justice and open the way for 
arbitrary prosecutions.’57 The Court found not only the applicant’s prosecution under Article 
301, but also the article itself to have violated Article 10 of the European Convention.  
 The ECtHR’s judgments in Gözel and Özer, Dink and Akçam, which concerned 
criminal convictions based on the amended version of the Penal Code (in 2005) and the Anti-
Terror Law (in 2006), validated the concern voiced on many occasions by the domestic and 
international human rights community that the reforms ‘have kept the contents of the former 
texts largely intact’ (Hammarberg, 2011: para.15). More recently, an unconventionally bold 
criticism by an ECtHR judge, and the Turkish judge on the bench no less, caused the 
government major diplomatic embarrassment. In an interview to Turkish press, Judge Işıl 
Karakaş stated that Turkey has the worst record on freedom of the press and freedom of 
expression among all members of the CoE (Karaca, 2011). Pointing out that the ECtHR 
found violations in more than 200 cases against Turkey, as opposed to 10 in the case of 
France, Judge Karakaş particularly drew attention to Article 6(2) and (5) of the Anti-Terror 
Law and Article 301 of the Penal Code as in violation of the European Convention and 
explicitly called for the abolishment of Article 301.     
 The persistence of the Turkish judiciary to disregard the ECHR standards and the 
ECtHR’s case law (Kurban, et al., 2008) shows that the infringements of freedom of press 
and expression in Turkey do not only stem from anti-democratic laws, but also from the 
entrenched understandings of judges and prosecutors.58 Making reference to his observation 
that ‘prosecutors and courts in Turkey often perceive dissidence and criticism, as well as the 
expression of minority identities, primarily as a threat to the integrity of the state,’ the CoE 
Commissioner for Human Rights stated that in ‘the absence of a drastic shift in the 
adjudicative approach of the judiciary,’ legal reforms will not be sufficient to ensure the 
protection of freedom of press (Hammarberg, 2011: para.39). A similar point was also made 
by Judge Karakaş of the ECtHR, who emphasized that long periods of pre-trial detention was 
not just a problem stemming from the laws but also from judges who decide on the 
continuation of detentions ‘on the basis of cliché’ remarks which do not provide sufficient 
reasoning (Karaca, 2011).  
 
 
                                                            
57 ECtHR, Taner Akçam v. Turkey (no. 27520/07), 25 October 2011, para. 94. 
58 A research study based on in depth interviews with judges and prosecutors of first degree courts reveals how 
prevalent the statist mentality can be among members of the legal profession (Sancar and Ümit, 2009).  
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5. The journalistic profession 
From the beginning, Turkish journalists played a significant role in the modernization of the 
Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Republic. The press has also consistently been the 
potential target of state/government repression or pressure (Elmas and Kurban, 2011). During 
the early years of the republic, opponent journalists were prosecuted by the Independence 
Courts (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri) and most of them were exiled. During the single party regime 
until 1950, the conflict between the ‘opponent’ (Istanbul) and ‘proponent’ (Ankara) press 
emanated from different approaches to the political regime. While journalists obtained some 
social rights via a liberal press law adopted during the first years of the multiparty regime, the 
honeymoon soon ended with the censorship policies of the government. Although the first 
coup d’état provided a truly liberal amendment to the Labour Law (no. 5953) in favour of 
journalists – and despite the protests of press owners - each and every coup of 1960, 1971 and 
1980 was followed by a period of military rule, which had significant repercussions for media 
freedom.  
The true shift in the journalistic profession came at the beginning of the 1980s through 
the new ownership structure. Traditional family-owned media ownership was replaced by new 
investors who already operated in other industries of the economy. The new owners of the 
Turkish press gradually carried the ‘corporate mentality’ to their media operations. Also due 
to the politically authoritarian post-coup d’état climate, the commercialization of the media 
ended with an increase in the sensationalisation and tabloidization of the press (Bek, 2004).  
The deregulation of the media markets in the 1990s resulted in the development of 
‘clientelist’ relationships between media patrons and the state, whereby the former began to 
exert pressure on politicians to maximize their profits in their other activity areas using their 
media outlets (Chrstensen, 2007: 185). At the same time, while media owners competed with 
each other financially, they by and large shared a common mindset which rested on protecting 
the ‘state interest.’ The most important political consequence of this new media structure was 
the ‘post-modern military coup’ of 28 February 1997, which many consider to be the fourth 
instance of military intervention in Turkey. Mainstream media organisations, prompted by 
Turkey’s military establishment, published fictitious news/content on the rise of Islamism. 
Cengiz Çandar and Mehmet Ali Birand, two renowned journalists working for a mainstream 
media organ, also became targets of the fictitious news leaked by the army chief of staff which 
alleged that they were on the payroll of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Kerkerên 
Kurdistan- PKK). Based on false documents fabricated by Çevik Bir, the general who was 
then the second in command of the chief of staff, allegedly quoted from the testimony of a 
PKK militant turned- informant, both journalists were labelled as ‘PKK agents’ by the 
mainstream media, who did not feel the need to verify the information leaked from the 
military. First Birand and some years later Çandar were fired from the national daily Sabah by 
their media owners, while a leading human rights activist also branded as a PKK agent 
survived an assassination attempt (Elmas and Kurban, 2011). 
It cannot be denied that the vulnerable position of journalists vis-à-vis their patrons or 
the state is at the same time the result of the absence of horizontal solidarity in the media. At 
the beginning of the 1990s, the new media owners forced journalists to make a choice 
between their labour union memberships and their jobs (Tılıç, 2000). Commenting on the 
obstacles to unionization, a labour union representative stated that as soon as employers find 
out about their unionized employees, they pressure them to quit the union. He added that their 
members who were dismissed due to their union activities cannot find a job in the sector. 
Journalists lack effective strategies to combat wage exploitation and unlawful dismissals. 
Few dare to bring a lawsuit against their former employers for fear of not being able to find a 
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job in the sector. The existence of a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among media companies not to 
hire journalists others have fired is widely commented on. The experience of Ahmet Şık, who 
was arrested as part of the Ergenekon cases a couple of months after he attended our 
workshop, is one of the most well known examples of this phenomenon. After having being 
dismissed in 2005 - on the World Press Freedom Day - from a newspaper belonging to the 
Doğan media group for his union activities, Şık could not find job in the sector for a long 
time. His employers had told him to quit the union and threatened that, if not, he would be 
dismissed and would not find a job elsewhere.59 Where journalists do go to court, cases take 
too long: ‘I file a case, it ends in six years!’60 Recent strikes at the daily Sabah and ATV 
television station failed due to suppressions of the employer and also lack of solidarity. Nine 
of the ten journalists who participated in the strike were dismissed from their jobs and the last 
one subsequently resigned to save his indemnity (Cinmen, 2011, Ergün, 2011; and Tılıç, 
2011). Today, according to the data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the 
Turkish Journalists Union has 4,550 members; and the rate of unionization in the journalism 
sector is 28.9 per cent. However, it is hard to say that these numbers are accurate as not all of 
these memberships are active (Tulgar, 2006).  
 When the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AK Party) 
came to power in 2002, the media owners initially supported the new government. This 
positive atmosphere largely eroded after AK Party’s second electoral victory in 2004. The 
collaborative attempts of a group of political elites and media owners to bring an end to AK 
Party’s power caused irreversible conflicts between the government and the media. The fall 
out was particularly visible in the largest media group’s (Doğan Group) opposition to the 
government reform packages. Most strikingly, on 10 February 2008, the constitutional 
amendment adopted by the parliament to legalize the headscarf at universities was covered by 
Hürriyet, the biggest Turkish daily with the headline ‘411 hands rose to chaos,’ referring to 
the number of parliamentarians who voted in favour. Hürriyet was also instrumental in 
generating public opinion in favour of mass demonstrations in the name of protecting 
secularism against the government, which were later found to be co-organized by groups 
involving retired high rank military leaders. In response, the AK Party government developed 
a dual strategy to eliminate media opposition. On one hand, it forced the Doğan Group to 
downsize its media investments by introducing disproportionately heavy fines for tax fraud. 
On the other hand, the government reconfigured the mainstream media. In 2007, the second 
largest media group was bought by Çalık Holding, which has close ties to the government, 
thanks to credits provided by two major public banks. The chairman of the board of this 
group is the son-in-law of the Prime Minister. Thus, the power shifted from opponent 
mainstream media companies to ‘reconfigured’ or ‘proponent’ media companies. Some 
analysts argue that AKP’s coming to power was a milestone for the media in Turkey, which 
needs to be analyzed in accordance with a pre and post AKP comparison. Others, however, 
believe that the current situation where most media is named as ‘pro-government’ is an 
inevitable outcome of the 2001 crisis, which resulted in the withdrawal of the financial sector 
from the media and the entry of new capital to fill the gap.61  
 As experienced journalist Ragıp Duran suggested, the media which formerly wore the 
(invisible) ‘epaulette’ henceforth became ‘green,’ shifting from a pro-military to a pro-
Islamist government position (Duran, 2011). To illustrate this change, Duran refers to the 
meeting the Prime Minister convened in October 2011 with the owners and executives of 
                                                            
59 A journalist, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Labour Relations and Working Conditions in the Media 
Sector’, Istanbul, 21/12 2010. 
60 ibid.  
61Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Media and Democratisation’, Istanbul, 08/10/2010. 
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media organizations to beseech them to be ‘sensible’ in their coverage of ‘terrorism and 
violence incidents.’ The day after this meeting, the five biggest news agencies ‘Anadolu 
Agency (AA), Turkish News Agency (AHT), Ankara News Agency (ANKA), Cihan News 
Agency (CİHAN) and İhlas News Agency (İHA) announced in a joint statement that they 
were going to “comply with the publication bans of the competent authorities”’ (Söylemez, 
2011). 
 The shifting power influenced not only the ownership structure, but albeit indirectly 
also editorial policies and increased self-censorship. Thereby, as pointed out by a journalist, 
the media ownership structure in Turkey presents an obstacle to media diversity and 
pluralism: ‘when I look at the newspapers in the morning, I see two groups. The media has 
established such a monopoly that it does not cover any news about social and environmental 
or world affairs.’62  
 On the other hand, the media owners’ preoccupation with keeping good relations with 
the state has been more decisive in self-censorship in comparison with direct threats facing 
journalists. The recent discharge of Banu Güven, one of the most respected and reliable 
journalists on television, following her critical coverage of government policies on the 
Kurdish issue demonstrated that self-censorship arose from the media owners’ policies rather 
than pressure from the ruling party (Tekerek, 2011). Arguably, it is the government’s 
pressure on media groups, such as the disproportionate tax fines imposed on the Doğan 
Media Group, that causes such self-censorship. The Prime Minister Erdoğan’s plea to media 
owners to keep under control or otherwise dismiss columnists for their negative press 
coverage of the government’s fiscal policies –on the grounds that their distorted portrayals 
would serve to de-stabilise the economy- is another instance of such pressure (Duran, 2010). 
However, today, as in the past, it is the involvement of the media patrons in other sectors of 
the economy that makes them susceptible to such pressure and financially reliant on the 
government, which in turn leads them to pressure journalists to refrain from negative 
coverage of the government.  
 A recent survey shows that a very high percentage of journalists in Turkey believe 
that there is censorship and self-censorship in the media. Respondents express the fear that 
‘they might be taken to court for the content of their articles’ and feel intimidated by pressure 
from the government and media patrons (Arsan, 2011). On the other hand, journalists have 
always worked under intense legal and political pressure in Turkey. As seasoned journalist 
Alper Görmüş63 reminded with respect to its owner’s closure of weekly Nokta after the 
initiation of a criminal case at military courts,64 journalists are afraid to lose the ‘privileged’ 
economic and political position afforded to them by the media. According to Görmüş, self-
censorship results not from government pressure but from the unwillingness of media 
executives, columnists and editors to risk their careers and high incomes. On the other hand, 
criminal cases launched against media organs and journalists reporting on sensitive political 
issues not only cause the media to censor itself, but also constitute firsthand censorship. 
Indeed, the daily Taraf has faced about 300 criminal cases launched against its owner, editors 
and journalists as of July 2011.65 The tabloidization of news and violations of professional 
rules of ethics through inconsistent and even fictitious news in the Turkish media are the 
                                                            
62 A journalist, notes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Media and regulatory high bodies: The status of legal and 
governance regulations’. 
63 Alper Görmüş prepared a series on editorial independence in the media in Turkey including debates between 
other journalists, Taraf, available at: http://www.taraf.com.tr/alper-gormus/makale-lafla-editoryal-bagimsizlik-
gemisi-yurumez-1.htm (date accessed 11 November 2011). 
64 For more on the incidents leading to the closure of Nokta, see Elmas and Kurban, 47- 48. 
65 Interview with Markar Esayan,Vice Chief Editor of  daily Taraf, by Ceren Sözeri, Istanbul, 12/07/2011. 
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outcomes of ‘the industry’s fierce competition in the ratings “war”’ (Bek, 2004). The 
ideological polarizations and political divisions within and among various media and 
journalists’ associations prevent them from engaging in collaborative efforts to develop rules 
of self-regulation. The oldest of these associations is the Press Council (Basın Konseyi), 
which was established by a group of journalists in 1986. From the outset, the independence of 
this body from the state and official ideology has been highly contested by members of the 
profession. Currently, the Press Council ‘accounts to very few newspapers and does not enjoy 
significant respect among the media community’ (Zlatev, 2011: 36). Most recently, a number 
of key representatives including those from TRT and the Anatolian News Agency (official 
news agency of Turkey) withdrew from the council following a vote of confidence in 
November 2011 to keep Oktay Ekşi as its chairman. What has made Ekşi’s endorsement 
controversial was the fact that he had recently resigned from this post to run in the general 
elections as an MP candidate.  
 The 1998 Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities developed by the Journalists 
Association of Turkey (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti) is the most referred source on ethical 
codes for journalism. Recently, a group of journalists who parted their way with the Press 
Council established the Media Association (Medya Derneği) to support and raise the 
standards of the media. In 2011, the association announced a new code of ethics for 
journalists, which was developed during a three-day Media Ethics Workshop held in January 
of the same year. 
 The first print news ombudsman of Turkey was initiated in 1999 by the daily Milliyet. 
The initiative ended in a ‘car crash’ when the ombudsman was dismissed following his 
refusal to bow down to the management’s pressure to refrain from publishing a critical piece 
about the fabrication of facts in the newspaper (Baydar, 2011: 96). Currently, three Turkish 
newspapers (Sabah, Star and Milliyet) have active ombudsmen who (self) monitor the 
compliance of their paper with codes of journalistic ethics. The website editions are exempt 
from the ombudsmen’s mandate. While the ombudsman institution is seen as a potentially 
important monitoring force for the media, many doubt its effectiveness in a culture which 
does not tolerate criticism. In September 2006, RTÜK introduced a voluntary ombudsman 
mechanism for broadcasters. Currently, 34 national and local television channels have 
‘audience representatives,’ whose contact information is listed on RTÜK’s website. 
 The new technologies offer new opportunities to access alternative sources of 
information beyond the mainstream media. One of the most significant examples of such 
sources is the Independent Communication Network (Bağımsız İletişim Ağı- BİA), which was 
established in 1997 for monitoring and covering media freedom and promoting independent 
journalism in Turkey. Funded mainly by the EU Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, 
BİA gives training to journalists, communication students and NGOs; publishes handbooks 
on peace journalism; broadcasts radio programs for the local media; organizes conferences, 
forums and international exchange programs. Besides BİA and a handful of other successful 
examples, however, many of the online news media outlets release ‘copy-paste’ content from 
news agencies or the mainstream media. The government’s recent attempts to extend the 
Press Law to the online media and to issue press cards for journalists working for online 
media raised serious concerns regarding freedom of the press. The Alternative Informatics 
Association launched the ‘Internet needs freedom, not press cards’ campaign, criticizing the 
government’s initiative as an attempt of censorship and control of the media (Alternatif 
Bilişim Derneği, 2011). 
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5.1 The working conditions of journalists  
Labour relations in the media have been regulated by Law no. 5953 (commonly known as 
‘212’ because of the number of amendments) on the Regulation of the Employee-Employer 
Relations in the Journalism Profession in the Turkish Media Industry since 1952. However, 
despite the special rights granted to journalists by this law, for long years journalists have 
been employed without social security and under provisions of the Labour Law instead of the 
Law no. 5953.   
Although there have been some positive developments since the 1990s, most of the 
problems concerning the working conditions of journalists remain to be addressed. However, 
the fierce competition in the sector and the fear of unemployment prevent journalists from 
voicing their problems even through the media.66 The financial crisis of 2001, which resulted 
in the dismissal of about 5,000 journalists (Söylemez, 2011) working in media groups that 
had investments in the banking sector, has further exacerbated these fears.   
Conducting research on labour relations in the Turkish media sector is a difficult 
endeavour, owing not only to the informality of employment practices, but also the scarcity 
and inaccessibility of data. Research conducted for this report shows that a very high number 
of media employees lack social security benefits; journalists are forced to frequently change 
jobs, resulting in high employee turnover rates in the sector; and media companies are 
reluctant to pursue a transparent policy when it comes to labour relations. According to the 
data of Social Security Institution of Turkey (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu- SGK), a large 
majority of the employees in the media sector have an average seniority of less than five 
years.67  
 The sector-based findings of the 2009 Household Labour Force Survey of Turkish 
Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) confirm SGK data.68 Accordingly, the average seniority of 
employees working in large media groups in Turkey is five years. This drops down to one 
year for employees working without social security benefits. Journalists formally employed 
in the media work for an average of 50 hours a week, while 70 per cent of the informal 
employees work for an average of 40. In rare occasions, the government inspects whether 
media companies hire employees without social security insurance, as in the case of the 
inspection of the Doğan media group in 2010. While union representatives find regular 
inspections to every media company –in addition to the legal protection of the right to 
association and the penalization of employers who arbitrarily dismiss journalists for their 
union activities- to be an effective mechanism,69 others point out that the selective nature of 
inspections, which do not target pro-government media, which also violate the labour law.70 
                                                            
66 For an example, see: Internethaber (2011), ‘Medya toplu işten çıkarmalarla sarsılırken Sabah Grubu ve 
Habertürk'teki “küçülme” internet sayfalarına yansımadı’ [While media was shocked by collective redundancy, 
the downsizing of Sabah and Habertürk were not covered by media], available at: 
 http://www.internethaber.com/bu-haberi-vermeye-yurekleri-yetmedi-324040h.htm (date accessed 25 December 
2011). 
67  The data derived from SGK according to classifications included the media sector in the NACE 
(Nomenclature Générale des Activités Economiques dans les Communautés Européennes), the system used for 
statistical classification of economic activities in the EU countries. 
68 In an attempt to collect data on working conditions in large media groups in Turkey, we analyzed the survey 
results from companies employing 250 or more employees (a total of 100 surveys). 
69 Labour union representative, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Human Resources Problems and the 
Future of the Media Sector’, Ankara, 18/12/2010. 
70 An editor, minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Human Resources Problems and the Future of the Media 
Sector’, Ankara, 18/12/2010. 
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Union representatives point out that even the public broadcaster TRT is engaged in informal 
employment practices.71    
TURKSTAT survey also includes data on the wages earned by employees in the 
media sector. The highest monthly salary declared is 35 thousand TL (15 thousand EUR), 
while 25 per cent of the respondents reported they work for less than 1,000 TL (418 EUR) 
per month. The average monthly salary among the formally employed is 1,250 TL (521 
EUR). While 25 per cent of those informally employed work for a monthly salary of less than 
500 TL (208 EUR), the average monthly salary for this group is 560 TL (233 EUR). The 
wage imbalance between the employees not only disrupts relations in the workplace, but also 
constitutes a significant impediment to the unionization of journalists, which in turn further 
deteriorates working conditions. 
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Source: TURKSTAT Household Labour Force Surveys (2009) 
  
 Another important factor that adversely affects the working and living conditions of 
journalists is that private and public media enterprises are located in big cities, and mostly in 
Istanbul, where living costs are extremely high compared to the rest of the country. The 
disproportionate representation of the media and media professionals in Istanbul also 
accounts for the underdeveloped nature of the local media in Turkey. 
 According to TURKSTAT statistics on print media, the total circulation rates of local 
and regional media were as low as 18 per cent in 2009. Local media is unable to employ 
qualified journalists, and those who seek to participate in labour force in the media sector are 
                                                            
71 ibid. 
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forced to live in big cities. This affects not only the working conditions of journalists but also 
the media content they produce, resulting in an Istanbul centric flow of news and information.  
 The root cause of the poor working conditions, problems in organising and the 
imbalanced geographical distribution in the media sector is the gap between legal regulations 
and their implementation, as well as the economic structure of the sector. Media enterprises 
that make no profit and work under conditions far from economically rational survive solely 
on the resistance of their owners, who want to stay in the sector in order to maximize their 
profits in the other sectors they invest in. In other words, labour exploitation is a significant 
source of media subsidy in Turkey; a media executive stated that this situation creates an 
extraordinary pressure for cost-cutting on the owners.72 These conditions make issues such as 
increasing the quality of journalists and improving their working conditions secondary, and 
result in informal employment practices which are detrimental for journalists. An editor 
working for a broadcasting company said the following on the lack of skilled journalists in 
the sector: ‘Nobody wants to invest in high quality media in Turkey. They make an effort to 
hire young, inexperienced, presentable individuals who are unaware of and who do not care 
about ethical aspect of the media.’73 
 
                                                            
72 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Media and Democratisation’, Istanbul, 8/10/2010. 
73 Minutes of the workshop on the topic of ‘Human Resources Problems and the Future of the Media Sector’, 
Ankara, 18/12/2010. 
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6. Media literacy and transparency requirements  
According to surveys, an average adult in Turkey watches television for 2.8 hours a day. This 
number is 6.8 hours for housewives and 2-2.5 hours for children. An average adult reads 0.1 
newspaper every day, and 0.02 weekly and 0.1 monthly newspapers and journals. S/he listens 
to the radio for 2.3 hours a week (Sözeri and Güney 2011; RTÜK, 2006). In view of the high 
access rate of television (98 per cent) and long watching hours, the effects of the media 
particularly on children and young adults and the concentrated market structure that does not 
allow for pluralism, media literacy is considered as the core element for the expansion of  
democratic culture in Turkey (İnceoğlu, 2007).  
 RTÜK’s project for media literacy education in primary schools was extensively 
debated by the regulatory authority and academics during the First Media Literacy 
Conference in 2005. In 2006, elective media literacy courses started to be taught to children 
in the 6th, 7th and 8th grades with the cooperation of RTÜK and the Ministry of National 
Education. A guideline for teachers was prepared in collaboration with the Board of 
Education and Discipline (Talim Terbiye Kurulu) and academics from various 
communication faculties in Turkey.  
 The first research conducted on the effects of media literacy courses on teachers and 
students welcomed the initiative ‘which will have several positive effects on children’ but 
warned of the ‘possibility of the project’s failure since the classes are taught by social science 
teachers and not by specialists of communication.’ The research asserts that the question of 
who should teach these classes has been prioritized over how their content or methodology 
should be. The ‘teachers are not aware of the difference between evaluation and media 
criticism’ (İnceoğlu, 2007). Teachers are reported to feel inadequate to teach media literacy: 
‘The subject of the course is not my professional area. I tell the students what I know and 
what I think about the media. A media specialist should teach this course’ (Yazıcı, 2011). 
Although RTÜK’s director also proposed these courses should be taught by graduates of 
faculties of communication (IV. Kuvvet Medya, 2011), these individuals lack pedagogic 
formation and are thus unqualified to teach (Ajans1, 2009). 
 On the other hand, RTÜK’s approach to media literacy has also received criticism on 
the ground that it is fuelled by a protective mentality. In the guide books, children ‘are seen 
as the “most sensitive group” prone to media effect’ and portrayed as ‘vulnerable receivers’ 
whose consciousness on the media need to be raised. The courses are not designed from a 
pedagogical perspective on critical media literacy education. Moreover, the comments of 
children about the media after attending the media literacy program attest that this education 
introduces a conservative rather than a critical perspective on the media (Bek, 2011). 
 On the other hand, considering that media literacy is not only a matter of education, 
but also a political and ideological issue and a component of social opposition, it is 
sometimes classified as a new social movement (Hepkon and Aydın, 2005). In recent years, 
there has been a growing awareness on the need for social monitoring of the media. The 
inability and unwillingness of the media to regulate itself, as well as the authoritarian and 
punitive nature of state regulation mobilized civil society to monitor the media’s compliance 
with universal principles and professional codes of ethics. Various non governmental 
organizations and activist groups started media watch initiatives in order to expand the 
culture of diversity and to reduce discrimination, racism and hate speech. For example, 
MEDİZ (Woman’s Media Watch Group)74 has been monitoring sexism in the media since 
                                                            
74 MEDIZ [Women’s Media Watch Group], available at:  http://www.mediz.org/Kategori/13/1/English.aspx 
(date accessed 27 December 2011). 
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2006. The group opened the issue to public discussion at a conference titled ‘For a non-sexist 
Media’ and published a book named End to Sexism in Media. KAOS GL75 regularly watches 
sexism and discrimination in the media against LGBT individuals.  
 After the assassination of the Armenian journalist and human rights defender Hrant 
Dink in 2007, hate crimes and hate speech in the media became a pressing issue for civil 
society. The Association for Social Change (Sosyal Değişim Derneği)76 prepared a report 
entitled Hate Crimes in National Press: 10 years, 10 examples and recently launched a 
campaign for the adoption of Turkey’s first anti-hate speech law. Similarly, the International 
Hrant Dink Foundation77 combats racism and discrimination based on ethnic and religious 
grounds through media monitoring. During a two years project funded by the European 
Commission, the Foundation analyzed 24 newspapers, published four monthly reports and 
organized workshops for journalists. The Human Rights Joint Platform (İnsan Hakları Ortak 
Platformu- İHOP)78 published a report titled I am not Racist but...: Racist and Discriminatory 
Speech in the Press, which points out that ‘discrimination denial strategy’ is one of the most 
typical examples for discrimination in the media. 
 
 
 
                                                            
75 KAOS GL [LGBTT’s News Portal], available at: http://www.kaosgl.org/category.php?id=21-0 (date accessed 
27 December 2011). 
76 Sosyal Değişim Derneği [The Association for Social Change], available at:  
http://www.nefretme.org/hakkinda/ (date accessed 27 December 2011). 
77International Hrant Dink Foundation, Media watch on hate speech, available at: 
http://www.nefretsoylemi.org/en/index.asp (date accessed 27 December 2011). 
78 IHOP [Human Rights Joint Platform], available at: 
http://www.ihop.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=351&Itemid=46 (date accessed 27 
December 2011). 
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7. Conclusion  
An analysis of media independence and freedom of the press in Turkey is not just a matter of 
an analysis of the regulatory framework governing media content and structure, but also calls 
for a critical assessment of media-state relationships from a historical perspective. From the 
outset, since the establishment of the first newspaper in the late Ottoman era, the media in 
Turkey has never been independent of the state. Neither has the media ever had such a claim 
or aspiration. To the contrary, since its emergence, the press was designed as a tool of 
political power and tasked with the mission of spreading the official ideology to the masses. 
With the transition to the republic, the Turkish press was used by the founders as an effective 
tool in processes of state formation and modernization. The attempts by a minority to 
establish a truly independent and free press were rebuffed by the punishment of dissident 
media. Since the late 19th century, opponent journalists have been suppressed by state and 
non-state actors who claimed to act in the name of ‘state interests,’ evident in the dozens of 
assassinations by ‘unknown’ perpetrators. The transition from an authoritarian single-party 
regime to a multiparty democracy in the 1950s did not change this fact; the press continued to 
be used by successive governments to consolidate their political power, be it military regimes 
or civilian governments.   
 The economic liberalisation of the 1980s resulted in the entry of new investors into 
the media sector, resulting in substantial change in the ownership structure. The profile of 
media patrons changed from journalist families to companies which also had investments in 
other sectors. Independent newspapers were replaced by companies that owned multiple 
newspapers and magazines. The ending of state monopoly over broadcasting in the 1990s and 
the proliferation of private broadcasters introduced the second wave of structural change in 
the sector; the media started to be dominated by only a handful of large corporations, which 
increased their economic power through vertical and horizontal mergers. The concentration in 
the media was made possible with the inadequacy of legal barriers to cross-mergers, as well 
as the lack of legal barriers that would prevent media conglomerates from participating into 
public tenders in other sectors they had investments in. The inadequacy of the regulatory 
framework to promote press freedom and diversity in the media has encouraged big 
corporations to see themselves as political actors that can bargain with the government 
(Mahçupyan, 2011). These corporations competed with the government for profit in sectors 
such as construction, transportation and industry. At the same time, media owners were 
extremely dependent on the clientelist relations with the state which enabled them to acquire 
tenders to undertake massive projects financed by the public. This has prevented these 
companies from performing the watchdog function expected from the media in established 
democracies.  
 The economic crisis of 2000-2001 caused by the collapse of private banks resulted in 
a new wave of structural change in the media. This time, the entire sector was restructured 
with major changes in the ownership structure. The collapse of media conglomerates which 
owned some of these bankrupt banks led to their withdrawal from the sector and the transfer 
of their broadcasting companies to the state. The crisis had two major outcomes: the 
emergence of the state as a principal media owner and the establishment of high regulatory 
bodies. Newspapers, radios and televisions taken over by the state after the financial crisis 
were bought by companies which had no prior investment or experience in the media sector, 
but had close ties to the AK Party government. As a result of this reconfiguration of the 
mainstream media, the balance of power shifted in favour of the government and against the 
military which hitherto exercised ideological control over the media. Initially, the conflict 
between the government and the military was reflected in the media, which was sharply 
divided along pro-government and pro-military lines. The polarization in the media reached 
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its peak in the run up to the presidential and general elections in 2007. With the launching of 
the Ergenekon cases against senior retired and on-duty military leaders accused of plotting a 
coup against the government, the re-election of AK Party in the general elections, and the 
election of a president from an Islamist background radically changed media-government 
relations in Turkey. Mainstream media organs which had backed the military’s psychological 
warfare against AK Party drastically changed their positions; so much so that virtually all 
media has become pro-government. 
 The late 1990s and early 2000s also witnessed the initiation of the EU accession 
process, which served as the most recent and powerful trigger of structural change in the 
media sector. In order to align its legal framework with the EU’s acquis, Turkey had to 
undertake major reforms not only in laws and regulations concerning ownership of the media, 
but also those concerning content. In the meantime, the processes of globalization, the 
advancements in information technology, the growth of the Turkish economy and the 
prospect of stability offered by the EU candidacy not only rendered the media in Turkey an 
attractive sector for foreign investors, but also generated a need for further structural reform 
to cope with the rapidly changing technological developments in the sector. The outcome of 
these political, economic and social developments during the last three decades has been an 
extremely complex regulatory framework, which continues to be reshaped and redesigned, 
causing tremendous uncertainty for both the players and the wider public. 
    Eager to join the EU, Turkey also found itself having to undertake substantial reforms 
in the sphere of human rights and media freedom. Hundreds of ECtHR judgments waiting to 
be executed by the Turkish state provided the EU with an effective benchmark for measuring 
Turkey’s progress in fulfilling the political criteria for membership to the Union. Dozens of 
these judgments pertained to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. While the need 
for the complete overhaul of Turkey’s constitutional and legal framework was evident, the 
change proved to be very difficult. Thanks to a series of constitutional amendments and 
‘reform packages,’ some progress was achieved towards the protection of human rights and 
press freedom. On the other hand, not only has progress been limited, but it has also been 
marked with regressions. While the AK Party government introduced significant human 
rights reforms in the early 2000s, it substantially rolled most of them back in later years, 
particularly after 2005. Turkey continues to have an extremely restrictive anti-terror law and 
its penal code retains authoritarian provisions in violation of fundamental rights and 
freedoms. The amorphous and over inclusive definition of terrorism and terrorist activity in 
the laws has caused hundreds of human rights activists, journalists and politicians to be 
prosecuted on remand for lawful political activities.  
 While there is a formal commitment to freedom of expression, freedom of the press 
and freedom of information in Turkey’s laws, what lies beyond this seemingly liberal facade 
is a framework where nationalism, statism and cultural conservatism are the supreme values 
looming over individual rights. The Constitution and the laws governing the media are 
written with an authoritarian, paternalistic and conservative spirit, making the exercise of 
freedom of expression and media freedom prohibitively difficult due to expansive 
restrictions. The marginal space left in laws for the exercise of these freedoms is restricted 
further with media regulatory agencies, which are equipped with extensive sanctioning 
powers. The principal role designed for these agencies in Turkey is not policy making for the 
media but rather policing, which they successfully perform. 
 In an environment where the media is dominated by corporations driven with profit 
maximization and which therefore refrain from building adversarial relations with the state, 
the emergence and survival of an independent media proves difficult. The existence of an 
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authoritarian legal framework which penalizes critical media coverage of sensitive political 
issues accentuates this challenge. The handful independent media organs which try to provide 
the public access to truth face significant financial difficulties and are harassed by criminal 
prosecutions. Virtually all journalists, of the mainstream and dissident media alike, work 
under extremely harsh conditions of very low wages, lack of social security, long work hours 
and lack of job security. Journalists who dared to join labour unions have faced and continue 
to face pressure, harassment and threats from their employers and often have to choose 
between their rights and their jobs. It cannot be denied that the vulnerable position of the 
journalists in face of the media owners or the political power is at the same time the result of 
the lack of horizontal solidarity among the journalists. The competition among the workforce 
and the fear of unemployment prevent journalists from voicing their problems even through 
the media.  
 As a result, the prospects for media independence and freedom in Turkey appear 
extremely weak. In a sector driven by corporate interests, nepotism and clientelist relations, 
the media owners do not have the incentive to provide truthful and critical news coverage. 
The historical weakness of trade unions in Turkey, the high level of unemployment among 
journalists, the high turnover rate in the sector and the deep divisions among journalists due 
to ideological differences make it very difficult for media employees to engage in a unified 
struggle against their employers. The lack of a strong pro-democracy social movement, the 
ideological conservatism of the judiciary, the institutional weakness of the parliament and the 
lack of democracy within political parties render the government –and future governments– 
too powerful vis-à-vis the society and the media. On a positive note, however, there is a 
growing awareness on the need for social monitoring of the media. The inability and the 
unwillingness of the media to regulate itself, as well as the authoritarian and punitive nature 
of state regulation, has mobilized the civil society to monitor the media’s compliance with 
universal principles and professional ethical codes and to combat discrimination and hate 
speech in the media.  
 While Turkey has undergone significant political reforms in the past decade and will 
continue to do so, change will not be quick or easy. What awaits the society in general and 
the media in particular is a long struggle, where real change will only be possible with an 
overhaul of institutions and a radical change in mindsets.     
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